On The Russia-Ukraine War: A War Of Two Worlds
The United States, China, and Russia exist in a world where US hegemony has been replaced by multipolarity. Rejection of the post WWII international order has led to a need for adaptation--fast.
According to realist scholar John Mearsheimer, we are in a more dangerous period in terms of potential great power confrontation than at the height of the cold war. There are two points where direct confrontations between the United States and a great power are possible: over Taiwan in the Pacific against China, or in Ukraine against Russia. In Ukraine we have witnessed nearly 18 months of what happens when great power rivalries spiral out of control; we have also been given a taste of what modern warfare against two great powers will look like. Millions of civilians have been displaced; tens of thousands have been called up to front lines where their life expectancy drops to mere hours. We see a Russia that is cut off from the United States and Europe, placing two nuclear-armed powers directly into each other’s crosshairs. In this environment, Ukrainians are given impossible tasks under impossible pressure. They are expected, with no air support, minimal training, and low ammunition to launch a counterattack against multiple lines of hardened Russian defenses, nestled comfortably behind rows of landmines. In response to depleted ammunition stores, the United States has resorted to sending cluster munitions to Ukraine–ammunition which is illegal in warfare due to its barbarism and propensity to shred civilians. In this modern moment, Ukrainians face a nearly impossible uphill battle where “Ukrainian courage” will only go so far. In this modern moment we see Russia, our once formidable ally in a battle against Nazi Germany, now increasingly appearing to be our sworn enemy. Across the Taiwan strait we see China, our greatest trading partner, as a strategic threat that may be on a collision course with our pacific fleets–A collision course which will lead to the decimation of Taiwanese, American, and Chinese aircraft, vessels, and personnel, on a scale never seen in warfare. The current conflict over Russia is different from any military confrontation in modern history, and the complexities of this strange war will take decades to understand. As this war appears to have no end in sight, a discussion is in order for the causes, continuation, and possible exit-strategies for this war, in the complicated geopolitical reality of our time.
The Start Of The War: Living In Two Worlds
To understand the Ukraine war and its origins, one cannot remain in the world of ideals. In an ideal world there is no warfare. In an ideal world, international disputes are settled by a fair and impartial court system, with international laws against aggression being maintained at all costs. In this world, there would never have been a Ukraine war. In this world, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would not be possible, for they would have broken a rule that was unbreakable in the framework of the game. But we do not live in this world. We do not live in a world united by one international community, but a world where the dominant idea is that the world is a boundaryless battlefield, where everything is viewed through the lens of strategy. Democracies are built on military might, to respond to the military might of the world’s autocracies, which fear the power of the arsenals of democracy. Autocracies routinely perceive democracies as attempting to sabotage their system of governance, to the point where a conflict breaks out. In 2014, the fall of Viktor Yanukovytch in Ukraine–a highly dis-favorable outcome for the Russians–led to the invasion and annexation of Crimea. In China, the democratic island of Taiwan is viewed as an existential threat, with land so sacred to the nationalist CCP that the very existence of Taiwan is viewed as a great danger to the Chinese government.
In the liberal world order that was built in the aftermath of World War Two, there was a serious flaw. The fall of Nazi Germany and Japan, and the horrors that were unleashed through the holocaust brought terror that the world had never seen. We did not yet know the limitations of the Soviet engine that produced more equipment from one factory than the Germans could produce across their entire empire (from a complaint written by Adolf Hitler). With the fall of Hitler and the impending collapse of Japan, the world was facing, yet again, the prospect of the end of massive international conflict and the hope for peace. Yet all we could think about was the Soviet machine, and its dictator at the helm. After the fall of the Island and Eastern European empires, a truly world-wide war began: a war on communism.
The war on communism was less catastrophic than the world wars, but its reach was far more vast. Communism was vague: Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans, Vietnamese, Koreans, and UC Berkeley college students became lumped together under a vague term, communism, which in the era of McCarthyism became quite a meaningless label. In a global cold war where communist containment was a primary objective, an ignorant CIA and US foreign policy drove countries that had little in common but a multi-meaning name into each other's orbits. Soviet and Sino communism, for instance, had little in common with each other. Post-Stalin communism was mostly about corrupt elites making the most out of their country’s black markets, with communist revolutionaries like Che Guevara finding them to be a major disappointment. This communism collapsed, with the weakening and eventual break-apart of the Soviet Union plunging Russia into deep corruption and poverty, as they watched former satellites of the soviet union drift into the orbit of the now sole global superpower: the United States.
Even as the United States became the sole superpower, projecting power into the world’s oceans in a way that dwarfed the might of the former British navy, the world continued to be seen from the lenses of security and strategy. The bombings of the twin towers on September 11th, 2001, marked a new era in the United States that saw a robust expansion of security spending and the creation of the umbrella agency, the Department of Homeland Security. The dominant apparatus in the United States was its security system, and the dominant mindset with the loudest voices were those who came from sects within the security apparat in the US. We relied increasingly on our national intelligence and special forces to solve our problems, using our weapons to rip through the slow-moving process of relationship building with Muslim communities during the war on terror. With the mindset of another global war, one on terrorism, we once again united massive swaths of the world against us, who would normally have little in common with one another, in alliances born from necessity and not naturality. When we wanted to get our way, our CIA and military could destabilize faster than our statesmen could negotiate. Autocracies around the world fell in places like Libya, and in Syria they were only saved by the intervention of an eager Russia. When Gadhafi fell in Libya the idea of a free and democratic Libya imagined by the Obama Administration fell apart quicker, given that the several thousand NATO airstrikes hadn’t done much to prepare the country for democratic rule. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, there were successes anywhere the United States military could find a conventional target. But the process of building a state failed each time. Force, the dominant tool in the post-9/11 world and relied upon by democracies, was failing to achieve its goals and it was driving autocracies together. It was this tool that has been hypothesized by John Mearsheimer as the reason for the Russo-Ukraine war, in the form of NATO expansion and power projection eastwards.
Russian containment has been a top US foreign policy objective for decades. Anti-Russian sentiment thrived during the cold war not only in the United States but in the European countries who were subject to the horrors of the Stalinist Soviet Union. Most of Europe was fine to see a crippled, divided, corrupt, poor, and eventually democratic Russia. These hopes were dashed when Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin was the leader a corrupt Russia needed. While it is hard to imagine such a leader in the West, Putin’s leadership and experience in the KGB served him well in a land of thugs and organized crime. While some hoped for a democratic, small Russia, Russian nationalism was revived under Putin, who sought to bring Russia back to great power status. Russian military interventions in Moldova, Georgia, and Syria helped to bring Russia back into the spotlight. It is easily arguable that Russia is today a great power, but what took place at the start of their invasion of Ukraine is only the beginning of what is to come.
Where The Two Different Worlds Collide
In the democratic west, it is believed that the only language Putin understands is force. However, they are not the first to use this phrase. When missiles were deposited on Cuban soil, it was Nikita Khruschev who first quipped to Che Guevara and Fidel Castro that the only language the Americans understand is force. In the era of the cold war the bipolar world of US and Russian dominance was based on mutually assured destruction–on deterrence. A direct confrontation with a nuclear armed power was seen as obviously dangerous because the leadership could set fire to the world as a last resort. In this world the United States, Russia, and to a lesser extent China engaged in a global war on communism through proxy wars, fighting across Latin America, Asia, Africa–anywhere but where the nukes were housed.
After the Soviet Union fell, the United States expanded their hegemony from their own backyard in the Western Hemisphere and moved it toward the Eastern Hemisphere, having the capability to project serious naval power in two oceans simultaneously. In this world there was no room for a second great power. There was no room for a hegemon in the east where trillions flow in shipping traffic. Containing these rising powers feels necessary for the West, but this containment has failed.
Russia and China are no longer weakened powers that will fade into the pages of history. They are back. The industrial power of China is so great that, like the United States during World War II, it could easily transition to a military-producing machine. Russia, while the lesser of the three powers, is in the midst of adapting their industrial power to be able to more effectively produce weapons and war equipment–their partial mobilization and invasion of Ukraine is only the beginning. Military is only the tip of the spear in foreign policy, however. Both countries enjoy increasingly favorable positions in the greater, non-European international community. Their influence is spreading, and a policy of containment and sanctions is only furthering their growth. Military containment, through freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea, to a heavily armed Ukraine will not stop a great power, but in this case it can contribute to its provocation.
The military buildup in Ukraine was a red line for Russia. It was a red line that the Russians were clear on, and NATO movement near Russia’s borders, particularly in sensitive areas, was not going to be tolerated. This has been Russia’s mindset and they have made it clear. However, until recently, they did not have the teeth to back up their red lines. John Mearsheimer argues this frequently. His line of reasoning follows the realist theory of international relations and realpolitik. It is centered on the idea of geopolitics and that provoking a great power will lead to conflict. NATO expansion (while not membership, but weapons) eastwards into Ukraine was a red line for Russia, and they made this clear. When their demands were not met, they struck. This argument has been met with tremendous criticism in mainstream circles and as shallow for not considering Vladimir Putin’s agency.
The world that Mearsheimer is discussing, of geopolitics and the realist theory, is the world which the Russians and Chinese work in. In this world, demands that are not met will be settled with force when negotiations are not met. Prior to the rise of Russia and China’s military, the closest we saw to a standup to US hegemony was in the form of guerilla and terrorist movements. The Russian invasion has drawn tremendous condemnation from Americans and Europeans. Russia’s war, they argue, has no international legitimacy and must be stopped at all costs. It is an illegal invasion, when considering the international system. Russia’s current regime, however, has no interest in playing by these rules–they are in a different game. They feel threatened by a well-armed Ukraine on their doorstep. Their response to this was to send warnings and produce an ultimatum which was ignored. The rest is history. The West’s response is to arm the Ukrainians as much as possible, sending billions of dollars in Western weapons and equipment. Mearsheimer’s argument has no merit to them because it was Russia that attacked Ukraine, and not the alternative. Now this is true, and it is of no fault to the Ukrainians that they now find themselves fighting. However, we find ourselves in a difficult conundrum: Russia will not back down–they have reached their line in the sand; and the Ukrainians have a supply of weapons to keep their fight going–they will not back down. The West continues to funnel weapons to Ukraine and the Russians continue to improve their ability to mobilize men and produce weapons. This war is on track to escalate much sooner than de-escalate.
How can the course of this war be changed? I argue that both of these ways of viewing the world, from Mearsheimer’s perspective and the West’s perspective (those like Robert Kagan, Carl Bildt), are missing important points. The realist perspective is frequently critiqued because it offers few solutions. If a great power is provoked, other powers must back down or risk a confrontation. Robert Kagan, a neoconservative and supporter of the Ukraine war, disagrees with the realist perspective the idea of backing town, tracing an argument back to World War II and the American identity. When we saw the horrors of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan the United States was not directly threatened. However, we were afraid of being an island in a sea of tyrants and we felt compelled to answer the call of our European allies. The American spirit is a helpful one, and we want to protect those who would consider us allies or partners. Kagan’s thesis of the world is that it is like a garden, but if it is left unkept, a jungle will grow in its place. This jungle includes strongmen like Putin in Russia or Assad in Syria. And in this argument for containment policies we must address these threats before they get out of hand. Realists, the argument would go, will back down to these tyrants and allow them to regrow the jungle of the world. However, from the perspective of a rising power being likened to a jungle that must be cut back, one can quickly see how such an analogy is quite unacceptable.
We stand in a peculiar moment because we are unwilling to directly engage the Russians and we are not prepared to capitulate to their demands. Normally, when a stronger power takes on a smaller one, when the smaller one can no longer fight back they stand down. But with Ukraine being on Western life support this capitulation has yet to happen. Our intervention and containment policies did not work, and despite our efforts we now have a strong Russia and China to contend with. Instead of contending with them strategically and militarily, perhaps it is time we reimagine our relationship with them all-together. We cannot yet dismiss the argument of John Mearsheimer that there was a red line that was crossed. If we assume that the Russians and Chinese only understand force, then we will have to confront them anywhere and everywhere. However, if we do consider their agency, we can understand that they can be reasoned with and there can be a middle ground between more fighting.
The Safest World Is A Three-Way Friendship Between The Superpowers
World War Two has been discussed frequently to analyze the Ukraine war. The Russians and Ukraine are viewed as similar to the Nazis and the Polish. One was too close and the other struck preemptively. The Germans had millions of men and ample machinery to conduct their invasions. The Russians, however, did not set forth with the forces for an occupation of Ukraine. The Western response and decision to intervene is likened to America’s decision to enter World War Two. There is reason to be critical of these comparisons, however. Russia is not Nazi Germany. Russia has a desire for greatness, but nowhere in that greatness does a Russianized Ukraine play a role, nor does a return to the Soviet Union. The Russia that we are dealing with today is not one that will contend with being a second-rate power, or one that will fall apart into one or multiple democracies. Seeking regime change or further destabilization will only result in wider conflict. What we can do is consider another aspect of World War II. When the Nazis turned on Russia and attacked, The allies and Russia found themselves aligned with one-another. As the Japanese pillaged, raped, and slaughtered the Chinese, the Chinese found themselves nearing America’s orbit. It was only after the fall of the empires and the progression of the cold war did we see rifts between these three great nations occur. But when we were forced into a corner, with the Germans and Japanese attacking and slaughtering our people, we set aside those differences and fought shoulder to shoulder. Joseph Stalin was crazed, but his people fought brutally to repress the Nazis. Vladimir Putin is strong, but it is a great Russia he seeks and it is one that can exist with friendship in the West. A great Russia today is not one we need to fear, but one we need to respect. If we are so keen to use World War II as an analogy, let’s further consider the damage inflicted to Russia from Ukraine in the last century. Millions of Russians died when their border with Ukraine was not secure, and a great Russia today will not stand for that. In the past we have been enemies of Russia, we have been allies with Russia, we have been partners with Russia, and here we stand once more as enemies of Russia. History is a wide space, and while we stand in a point of serious discontent now, we may find there is an unexpected friend: one who we can reason with, negotiate with, and coexist with.
Those who argue for isolationism have gotten it wrong, just as those who argue for the Western-dominated international order are missing the mark. Throughout history empires and great states have risen and fallen. Russia and China have gone through similar periods of humiliation and backwardness. The Russians with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the Chinese with the Opium Wars and their crushing defeats by the Japanese. These countries benefited from a strong West that allowed them to industrialize without investing much in their militaries. Perhaps it would have been better if they stayed that way. However we no longer live in this world. Now there is a strong Russia and China, and how we respond to them, as friends or as threats, will dictate the world we live in for decades to come.
The perfect world for pragmatism is when there are sufficient super powers to balance each other. The USA's post WW2 dominance screwed the rest of us. I don't have to be a fake communist to sympathise with China's position, nor do I have to be a capitalist to know that we need the USA to forsake kleptocracy for democracy. As citizens, we're always gonna be screwed, so the best I hope for is to be screwed less.
Regards history, NATO and Nazis in Ukraine, checkout 3, 5 & 6 of 'Putin Isn't the Only Monster in Ukraine' . They're long so I suggest choosing just one. Of course, in the first, I quote Mearsheimer :)
https://mikehampton.substack.com/p/ukraine